Ensuring Effective Competition in Thailand

Why does it matter to ordinary citizens if competition between firms is effective? Citizens are also consumers, and effective competition ensures that consumers receive better prices, improved quality and a wider variety of choices.

Recent developments in Thailand’s restaurant sector illustrate how effective competition benefits consumers. The widely publicised price war in 2025 between MK Restaurant and Suki Teenoi is a vivid example of how Thai consumers can benefit from heightened competition. In response to weak demand and emerging competitors, MK Restaurant launched a low-price buffet campaign; Suki Teenoi then undercut this by offering its own promotional campaign. The competition between them led to significant promotional discounts. It even led MK Restaurant to launch a new low‑cost buffet brand and Suki Teenoi to offer a new premium option.

This example shows how firms respond to competitive pressure by lowering prices and improving offerings. Consumers ultimately gain through better value for money and expanded choices. Competition appears effective in at least one sector of the Thai economy—but what about other sectors?

Effective competition does not always occur naturally and may require government intervention. Firms may engage in mergers that harm competition, powerful firms may use business practices that harm their rivals and ultimately consumers, and groups of firms may enter into agreements to reduce competition between them.

To safeguard competition, countries including Thailand have passed laws to protect competition and established competition authorities to enforce these laws. While the precise rules differ across countries, competition laws typically include three core provisions:

• Merger control prohibits mergers or acquisitions that may lessen competition. For example, Paramount’s proposed acquisition of Warner Bros. in February 2026 will require approval from multiple competition authorities worldwide. Both firms produce well-known movies, for instance, Titanic and Interstellar from Paramount and The Matrix and Harry Potter from Warner Bros. The authorities will assess whether the acquisition would reduce competition through, for example, higher movie prices or reduced variety of films available to consumers.
• Prohibition of anticompetitive agreements prevents firms from coordinating on anticompetitive conducts such as collusion and price fixing. In 2023, Japan’s competition authority accused several companies of bid-rigging related to contracts for Tokyo 2020 Olympics test events. In 2025, the Tokyo High Court upheld a ¥300 million (~THB 60.5 million) fine on Dentsu Group, one of the firms involved.
• Prohibition of abuse of dominance restricts dominant firms from engaging in practices that harm competition, such as predatory pricing and tying/bundling. A leading example is the European Commission’s (EC) €4.34 billion (~THB 160 billion) fine against Google for tying its apps (Google Search and Chrome) to the Play Store, among other practices, which hindered the use of rival search engines on Android devices.

Thailand’s Trade Competition Act has been in effect since 2017. However, a recent review by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) identified several features of the current laws that prevent the Trade Competition Commission of Thailand (TCCT) from enforcing competition law effectively.

Thailand’s last parliament initiated amendments to the Trade Competition Act aimed at addressing some issues the OECD identified, aligning Thai competition law more closely with international standards and strengthening enforcement. However, this reform effort was suspended following the dissolution of parliament in December 2025. Whether it will resume depends on the priorities of the incoming government and legislature. If the process continues and the proposed amendments are enacted, they will bring several improvements to competition policy enforcement in Thailand.

• A major change concerns merger control. Under the current system, only mergers likely to create a monopoly or a dominant position require prior approval from the TCCT. In comparison, mergers that may substantially reduce competition only need post-merger notification, under which the TCCT cannot block the deal or impose remedies. For the proposed amendments, these mergers also would need prior approval from the TCCT.
• Another significant proposed change involves shifting abuse of dominance cases from criminal to administrative (disciplinary) penalties. This would lower the standard of proof from “beyond reasonable doubt” to the “balance of probabilities”. The former standard requires overwhelmingly strong evidence that the conduct is anticompetitive, while the latter requires only that the conduct is more likely than not to harm competition. In practice, abuse of dominance cases often involve complex economic analyses that rarely yield absolute conclusions. This change would make it easier for the TCCT to challenge anticompetitive conduct by dominant firms.

Almost all matters that fall under competition law—mergers, abuse of dominance and non-horizontal agreements—can be pro- or anti-competitive. Evaluating these matters typically requires careful economic analyses that balance pro- and anti-competitive effects. For example, a merger may reduce competition because there are fewer competitors in the market. Yet the same merger may also generate efficiencies, such as cost savings or higher investments, that benefit consumers. Robust economic analysis is therefore essential to assess these trade-offs, understand market dynamics and forecast likely outcomes. When done properly, it minimizes the risks of over- or underenforcement, protecting competition without discouraging legitimate business activities.

The debate surrounding the EC’s decision to block Amazon’s proposed acquisition of iRobot in 2024, followed by iRobot’s bankruptcy filing in December 2025, highlights the complexity of merger control enforcement and competition policy more broadly.13 The EC blocked the transaction on the grounds that it “could restrict competition in the market for [robot vacuum cleaners]”.14 Critics argued that the intervention may have been overly stringent, while others viewed it as a necessary safeguard against the risk of Amazon gaining a position of strength that might allow it to drive out competitors. Regardless of perspective, the case underscores the importance of transparent, evidence-based economic assessments in merger review and competition cases generally.

Effective competition policy levels the playing field for market participants. It ensures that consumers can purchase from firms offering the lowest prices, highest quality or best services. Thailand’s ongoing efforts to strengthen its competition framework are therefore beneficial to both consumers and firms that compete on the merits.

Strengthening the legal framework is clearly essential, but effective competition ultimately depends on consistent enforcement. We believe that economic analysis can play an important role in this. High quality economic analysis helps authorities make well-informed decisions that protect competition without holding back genuine business activities.

BRG’s Asia–Pacific competition practice brings together economists with experience across jurisdictions in Asia (including a dedicated presence in Bangkok), Europe and the United States to support businesses, authorities and policymakers in Thailand with economic analysis in complex competition cases.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions, position or policy of Berkeley Research Group, LLC or its other employees and affiliates.