Don’t Celebrate—Yet: From Signals to Rule in the US, Enforcement Still Decides the Truce

Ten days after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Week, what both capitals call a “pause” has started to cross from signal into a formal regulatory stay on the US side—while China’s side remains administrative and discretionary.

On November 1, 2025, the White House published a fact sheet outlining a trade and economic understanding with China: Beijing would suspend for one year the export controls introduced on October 9 (covering rare earths, gallium, germanium, antimony, lithium-battery materials, and equipment), and Washington would pause implementation of the “50 percent Affiliates Rule” under the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) starting November 10—now formalized via Federal Register (FR) Doc. 2025-19846 as a one-year stay. Meanwhile, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced temporary suspensions of export controls on select rare-earth and superhard-material items until November 10, 2026, but the licensing architecture remains intact. Until a MOFCOM/GACC (General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China) implementation circular defines scope lists, license templates, and review timelines, approval speed and documentation burden will remain discretionary levers.

In short, the United States has turned its truce into a legal rule; China has not. The difference underscores how compliance risk now depends less on new rules than on how each bureaucracy enforces—or delays—the ones already in place.

A reversible truce, not a rollback

The one-year timeframe buys space for each side to test market and diplomatic reactions without dismantling their underlying legal tools. It is the latest instance of US–China crisis management—a breathing space rather than a breakthrough.

The measures themselves are designed for reversibility. Beijing’s rare-earth suspensions can be reinstated by administrative order; Washington’s enforcement pause on the 50 percent Affiliates Rule depends on agency discretion, not statutory change. Crucially, neither capital has repealed nor amended the underlying authorities: Washington has authorized a one-year stay, while Beijing relies on revocable administrative suspensions. This preserves leverage while signaling moderation.

In practice, this activity means little has changed in daily compliance work. Licenses, documentation, and end-use declarations still determine what moves across borders. The rare-earth regime remains open but controlled, with approvals hinging on paperwork quality and timing rather than formal law.

For companies, the risk now lies less in new edicts than in how enforcement unfolds—procedural in Washington, deliberate in Beijing. The practical fight now moves to licensing mechanics.

Licensing as the new frontline

The real friction now resides in licensing and documentation rather than proclamations. China’s rare-earth regime remains an open but controlled turnstile system. Licenses and clearances continue under tighter scrutiny, meaning more granular end-use declarations, identity verification of downstream customers, and longer review cycles before shipments are approved. For companies, throughput will depend less on what the law says and more on how customs and licensing authorities handle applications. In the US, attention should focus on how BIS handles case-by-case affiliate relationships, license exceptions, and review timing under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) during the stay.

Negotiation through timing and optics

By opting for temporary, reversible gestures, both Washington and Beijing achieve domestic and international optics of de‑escalation without incurring strategic cost. These pauses let each side claim a win while retaining leverage. The timeline alignment—a one‑year window ending just before the US 2026 midterm political cycle and, to a lesser degree, China’s 2026 annual “Two Sessions” mid-cycle economic review—suggests both sides are buying time and room to maneuver.

Allies are the silent pressure valve

The APEC pause is being stabilized quietly by third-party governments unwilling to risk another US–China trade rupture. Brussels, Tokyo, and Canberra each moved quickly to frame Beijing’s rare-earth suspension as a constructive act—an approach that gives China diplomatic credit while constraining Washington’s appetite for immediate escalation.

The European Union’s (EU) trade commissioner publicly welcomed the move and engaged MOFCOM to fast-track pending EU licensing applications, turning a headline truce into an administrative process that benefits European industry. EU industry will read the BIS stay as welcome clarity on the US side even as they seek Chinese process certainty. Tokyo struck a balance: it echoed G7 concerns over coercive trade practices but used the same language of “stability” and “predictability” that Beijing favors, signaling that the group prefers managed calm to confrontation.

Canberra and Washington are using the suspension window to promote allied sourcing and refining projects as credible medium-term alternatives to Chinese processing. Even if those efforts cannot soon replace China’s capacity, their visibility alters Beijing’s risk calculus: the more plausible the alternative supply web becomes, the less value China will extract from toggling controls. Together, these allied actions transform a fragile bilateral pause into a multilateral constraint—quietly raising the diplomatic and economic cost for either side to break the truce.

What to watch for

With FR Doc. 2025-19846 filed and effective November 10, 2025, the marker shifts from publication to practice. Expect BIS frequently asked questions (FAQs) and enforcement guidance clarifying affiliate definitions—including control/ownership look-through, license exceptions, and review timelines during the one-year stay. Track whether backlog and processing times actually improve.

On the Chinese side, attention will shift to MOFCOM and GACC. Industry should watch for implementation circulars to define which rare-earth categories and technologies fall under the one‑year suspension, the form of streamlined licenses, and expected review timelines. These details will determine whether the suspension reduces friction or simply delays it.

Finally, monitor licensing delay metrics—the gap between policy intent and operational enforcement—in both the US BIS and China’s MOFCOM systems. In the US, watch turnaround times and backlog volumes for export licenses and case-by-case affiliate rulings; in China, track MOFCOM approval durations, added document requests, and tighter scrutiny of end-use declarations. Rising processing times or documentation burdens often signal de facto tightening before any rule change; shorter turnaround or higher approval rates indicate quiet relaxation.

Guidance for decision‑makers

Operate based on what is formally published today, not on statements of intent. When drafting or revising contracts, build in flexibility to handle future regulatory changes. This can be done through reopener clauses: provisions that allow pricing, delivery, or sourcing terms to be renegotiated automatically if a specific rule or government notice changes. For example, if China’s Ministry of Commerce releases a circular altering export-license requirements, a reopener ensures both parties can adjust rather than absorb unexpected costs or breach the agreement.

Where possible, cross-reference the US stay by citing FR Doc. 2025-19846 and any subsequent BIS FAQs/guidance. On the China side, tie reopeners to specific MOFCOM/GACC circular identifiers once they post. Maintain rigorous documentation—end-use affidavits, supplier attestations, and ownership mapping down to the 50 percent level—until agencies officially narrow those thresholds.

Avoid irreversible commitments based on the “pause” narrative. Continue diversification of magnet, battery, and rare-earth inputs, but time major routing or investment decisions to confirmed regulatory instruments. Treat the next sixty days as a validation window rather than a return to normal conditions.

Bottom line

De-escalation has entered the legal implementation phase on the US side (FR Doc. 2025-19846) but remains administrative and discretionary on the Chinese side.

Compliance teams should maintain dashboards of licensing turnaround times to detect shifts before they surface in public data, keep operations aligned to published instruments, and convert political promises into contractual safeguards.

Be ready to pivot the moment an agency posts a notice or interpretation that changes scope or timelines.

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References

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), “Department of Commerce Expands Entity List to Cover Affiliates of Listed Entities,” US Department of Commerce press release (September 29, 2025). https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-expands-entity-list-cover-affiliates-listed-entities

BIS, “Expansion of End-User Controls To Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities,” 90 FR 47201 (September 30, 2025). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/30/2025-19001/expansion-of-end-user-controls-to-cover-affiliates-of-certain-listed-entities

BIS, “One Year Suspension of Expansion of End-User Controls for Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities,” 90 FR 50857 (November 12, 2025). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/12/2025-19846/one-year-suspension-of-expansion-of-end-user-controls-for-affiliates-of-certain-listed-entities

Fox, Jim, “BIS to PAUSE Enforcement of the Recent Affiliate Rule,” Export Compliance Training Institute (November 3, 2025). https://learnexportcompliance.com/insights/bis-to-pause-enforcement-of-the-recent-affiliate-rule

McNeil, Sam, “European Union welcomes suspension of China’s rare earth controls,” Associated Press (November 4, 2025). https://apnews.com/article/909c251b9bd4bb6f3dc431e9fcfd9615

Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China, “MOFCOM Spokesperson’s Remarks on China’s Recent Economic and Trade Policies and Measures,” Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (October 11, 2025). https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/News/SpokesmansRemarks/art/2025/art_c202dcc0433d476db52b1e7f7fe53926.html

Reuters, “Exclusive: China starts work easing rare earth export rules but short of Trump hopes, sources say” (November 9, 2025). https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/china-starts-work-easing-rare-earth-export-rules-short-trump-hopes-sources-say-2025-11-07/

The White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Strikes Deal on Economic and Trade Relations with China (November 1, 2025). https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strikes-deal-on-economic-and-trade-relations-with-china/

The White House, Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, executive order (November 4, 2025). https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/11/modifying-reciprocal-tariff-rates-consistent-with-the-economic-and-trade-arrangement-between-the-united-states-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

Zhao, Claire, and AJ Cortese, “One-Year Warning: Navigating China’s REE Export Control Suspension,” The US-China Business Council (November 6, 2025). https://www.uschina.org/articles/one-year-warning-navigating-chinas-ree-export-control-suspension/